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YALE KAMISAR, FINAL FRONT IER: LIFE,
DEAT H, AND LAW: RIGHT TO DIE OR
LICENSE TO KILL?
Legal Times 26 (Nov. 13, 1989).

[T]o call Nancy Cruzan's case a matter of the right to die seems
strained, if not contrived. The situation is a tragic one. Cruzan has
been in a persistent vegetative state since 1983, when, at the age of 25,
she was in a severe car accident. Although she is able to breathe on
her own, she receives all her nutrition and fluids through a feeding
tube inserted into her stomach. When her parents sought to halt this
life support, they were rebuffed, first by officials of the Missouri state
hospital where Cruzan is a patient and ultimately by the Missouri
Supreme Court.
Many would argue that Nancy Cruzan is "better off dead." Others
would contend that keeping her alive is a misuse of limited
resourcesespecially at a time of soaring health-care costs. These
may be good policy arguments. But policy arguments do not establish
a constitutional right. • • •
Nancy Cruzan "' "' • did not ask to die or consent to her death.
Before lapsing into her present condition, she neither made a "living
will" nor executed any other directive requesting that she be allowed to
die without "medical intervention." Nor did she designate anyone else
to make health-care decisions for her.
When she was still a vibrant person, Cruzan once remarked that
she did not want to live "as a vegetable." In another conversation, she
stated that if she couldn't do things for herself "even halfway, let alone
not at all," she "wouldn't want to live that way." To a majority of the
Missouri Supreme Court, those remarks were so remote, general, and
casual as to be "unreliable for the purpose of establishing her intent."
For a guardian to exercise whatever right an incompetent person may
have to be free from life support, the court ruled, there must be "clear
and convincing evidence" of the incompetent patient's wishes.
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No doubt many medical/legal commentators would argue (or already have) that in a case like Cruzan the family decision to pull the
feeding tube should be honored. Indeed, a goodly number of other state
courts would reach (or already have reached) a different result than did
the Missouri Supreme Court. This is not surprising in an exploding,
still evolving area of law, morality, ethics, and social judgment.
But the U.S. Supreme Court could not establish a right to die in the
Cruzan case without generating other difficult questions: What quantum of proof is needed to support the right to die? What presumptions
and burdens of production and persuasion should the Court assign?
What should the right mean for the never-competent and the no-longercompetent? What if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
patient would prefer to die quickly by lethal injection, rather than
slowly by starvation and dehydration? If a person has a constitutional
right to die, why doesn't she have the right to choose what she regards
as the most "humane" or "dignified" way to die?
On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court could uphold the
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan without restricting other
states' authority to permit a different result on similar facts. After all,
the Court is not being asked to decide whether someone like Nancy
Cruzan has a constitutional right to live (although it would not be
surprising if someday someone made that argument). The issue presented is whether a state is constitutionally compelled to allow someone
in Cruzan's circumstances to die.
Those who favor letting "hopeless" patients die talk much about
"the patient's preference" and the "right of self-determination," about
"individual automony" and the "right to privacy" and the "right to
decide what is to be done with one's person." How meaningful are
these words and phrases in a case like Cruzan? Whose preferences are
really being advanced, Cruzan's or her family's? Whose right to decide
what to do with her person is really involved, Cruzan's or her family's?

* * *
I can hear the argument now: She is being kept alive "against her
will." Cruel as it is to say, Cruzan no longer has "a will." And she
never clearly explained her desires on life-and-death matters when she
did have one.
I can also hear the argument that the only way to honor Cruzan's
right to privacy is to let her family exercise it for her. But why start
with the premise that someone in her plight still has a right to privacy?
If the right exists because there are choices that belong to the individual alone, and the individual did not exercise those choices-and is no
longer able to do so-is it not more coherent to say that this right no
longer exists?
To be sure, the dissenting Missouri justices maintained that the
statements Cruzan made before becoming incompetent do provide sufficient evidence of her wish to be allowed to die in her present condition.
Some state courts would agree. Others would go still further and
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permit life support to be terminated absent any specific evidence of the
patient's intent if the family and physician deemed it in the patient's
"best interests" to do so.
On the other hand, the highest court of New York * * * would
probably side with the majority of the Missouri Supreme Court. Last
year, for example, in Matter of Westchester County Medical Center, 531
N.E.2d 607, the New York Court of Appeals underscored its "clear and
convincing" standard when it concluded that patient's remarks-before
she was struck and silenced by illness-that she would not want to live
without dignity or without being able to care for herself did not furnish
sufficient proof that she held "a firm and settled commitment to the
termination of life support" under the circumstances presented.
Other states are free to adopt a less demanding standard than
Missouri or New York. But must they?
Consider the views of Rabbi J. David Bleich, professor of Jewish
law and ethics at Yeshiva University's Benjamin N. Cardozo Law
School * * *'
"[A] casual comment reflecting an emotional reaction to a dramatic
presentation of the negative aspects of prolongation of life does not
constitute a reasoned, deliberate choice. Law provides that material
possessions may be disposed of only by a written testament executed in
a manner designed to assure that the decisions reflected therein reflect
deliberation, purpose, and seriousness of intent. Surely, no less a
standard should be acceptable for the disposition of one's life."
The question is not whether Professor Bleich is right or wrong.
The question is whether a state court (or a state legislature) that shares
his view is violating the federal Constitution. Can it seriously be said
that it is?
The argument that nothing in the Constitution prevents a state
from adopting such a demanding standard is particularly strong, I
think, when the death at issue is death by starvation and dehydration.
(No one has suggested that Nancy Cruzan ever considered the possibility of dying this way.) According to Mark Siegler, medical professor at
the University of Chicago, and Alan Weisbard, executive director of the
New Jersey Bioethics Commission, as recently as 1980 the idea that
fluids and nutrients might be withdrawn from any patient, even a
dying one, "was a notion that would have been repudiated, if not
condemned, by most health professionals." But the law has moved
quickly since then.

In recent years, the American Medical Association, various medical/legal groups, and some courts have rejected any distinction between
the termination of artificial feeding and the cessation of other forms of
life-sustaining treatment. But this is still a matter of considerable
dispute. Many respected commentators * * * insist that the distinction should be preserved for various reasons: (1) Nutrition and hydration are basic care, not medical treatment; (2) providing such care is an
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important symbol of our human relatedness and commitment to care;
(3) denial of such care poses a serious threat to the doctor/patient and
health-care facility/patient relationships; and (4) permitting withdrawal of nutrition and hydration undermines the psychological separation
of "killing" from "letting die."
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law is one of the
medical/legal groups that, in a 1987 report, did reject the distinction
between artificial nutrition and hydration and other forms of lifesustaining treatment. But for purposes of Cruzan, I think the conclusion the task force reached is less significant than an observation it
made along the way: Cases involving decisions about artificial nutrition
and hydration "are at the outer edges of our collective social and
medical experience." Indeed they are-all the more reason not to
constitutionalize them yet.
Although those who balk at terminating artificial nutrition and
hydration have not prevailed in bioethics circles recently, they have
met with considerable success in legislative halls. Consider this:
* * * nearly half of the 39 states that have adopted living-will
statutes (including Missouri) specifically exclude artificial nutrition and
hydration from the category of life-sustaining treatment that may be
refused. In only one state-Utah-does the law provide that a person
may give a directive to withdraw or withhold nutrition and hydration
in a living will.
If, as the Supreme Court recently told us in Stanford v. Kentucky,
110 S.Ct. 23 (1989), the pattern of enacted laws constitutes "the primary
and most reliable indication of consensus," the reluctance of many state
legislatures to permit the termination of artificial feeding, even where
the patient has executed a living will, poses a significant obstacle to the
right to die in cases like Cruzan.

Moreover, the living-will legislation presents a second hurdle. In
most states, a living will only becomes operative after its maker has
become "terminally ill[.]"
[As this term is commonly defined, a
patient must be suffering from an irreversible condition that will
produce death within a short time regardless of medical intervention.
If this common definition applies,] Nancy Cruzan is neither dying nor
terminally ill. If artificial nutrition and hydration are not stopped, she
could live for many years.
Again, I can hear the argument of right-to-die proponents: In this
area, the Supreme Court should defer to the medical profession, not to
the legislative consensus. Whether life-sustaining treatment should be
ended, at least when the family agrees with the doctor, is essentially a
medical judgment to be left to the medical community.
I think not. Whether a patient is in a vegetative state and
whether a patient's condition is irreversible are medical questions. But
whether a patient should live or die is not. Rather, it is a fundamental
moral-legal-philosophical-social-political question.
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